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N VIEW of the upsurge in unemployment during the period covered
by this review, it is surprising that the volume of workmen's com-
pensation cases reaching the appellate courts of Texas during the last year
has decreased rather than increased. A partial explanation for this may
be: (1) the efficient work of the hearing officers;' (2) increased unem-
ployment payments; (3) the equalization of attorneys' fees for repre-
senting claimants before the Industrial Accident Board and before the
courts;' (4) the fact that unsettled points of law in this field are fast
becoming fewer; and (5) the wide application of the rule that the Work-
men's Compensation Act' should be construed liberally so as to effectuate
the beneficent purpose for which it was enacted. The cases propounded
no startling innovations this year, but were mostly reiterations of well
established rules.
I. SUBSTANTIVE LAW
Good Cause. One of the first prerequisites to a recovery of compensation
benefits is that a claim for compensation be filed within six months from
the date of the injury. This requirement can be waived in a meritorious
case for good cause which exists up to the time the claim is filed. For
some peculiar reason, there seems to be a relation between the hard times
of recession and the late times of filing claims for compensation as speci-
fied in the Act.4 This brings into play the escape hatch that in meritorious
cases and for good cause strict compliance with the six-month filing re-
quirement may be waived. The test for determining whether good cause
for late filing exists up to the time the claim is made is the ordinarily
prudent person test.'
In Torres v. Western Casualty & Surety Co.' the Texas supreme court
held that such a case of good cause was presented where: (1) the ad-
juster had contacted the claimant less than three months after the injury
and assured him that he would be taken care of, and (2) the defendant
had paid the claimant's frequent medical bills.! Similarly, good faith reli-
ance by a claimant upon the assurances of her physicians that her injuries
* A.B., Southwestern University; J.D., University of Texas. Adjunct Professor of Law, Southern
Methodist University; Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
' TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 3, 10 (Supp. 1970).
'1d. art. 8306, § 7c, 7d.
'Id. arts. 8306-09(f) (1967).4 1d. art. 8307, § 4a.
'Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Hudgins, 294 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1956),
error ref. n.r.e.
6457 S.W.2d 50 (Tex. 1970).
" Almost identically, the submission to the jury of a good cause issue was justified in Texas
Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Stateler, 449 S.W.2d 533 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969), where the
claimant testified that the insured's adjuster told him not to worry, that all reports to the insurance
company and the board would be taken care of.
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were not serious constituted good cause for a period up to the time her
physicians advised her to the contrary.'
However, in Travelers Insurance Co. v. Warren8 the claimant's duty
of continuing diligence was reaffirmed, and it was held that, while the
claimant's reliance upon her employer's assurances that her claim had
been filed may have been justified for some period of time, as a matter
of law reliance thereon for twenty-two months was imprudent. Since
good cause did not exist "until the day the claim was actually filed,"'"
the judgment below was reversed and rendered."1
Course of Employment-Transportation and Travel. Both state and fed-
eral courts made an attempt to clarify the statutory provision that an
injury sustained by an employee while engaged in the dual purpose of
traveling in furtherance of the affairs or business of his employer and
also in furtherance 2 of his own personal or private affairs should not be
the basis for a claim that the injury was sustained in the course of employ-
ment-unless the trip would have been made even if there had been no
personal or private affairs of the employee to be furthered, and unless the
trip would not have been made if there had been no affairs or business
of the employer to be furthered thereby."2
In Davis v. Argonaut Southwest Insurance Co."' conflicting evidence
was presented as to whether the injury was incurred in the course of the
employees' employment. Evidence presented by the plaintiffs tended to
support the jury finding that the trip to Houston was made in the course
of employment. The defendant's evidence, however, indicated that the
trip was planned for personal reasons, and that the employer's foreman
had, after learning of the plans, asked the employees to pick up some
supplies while they were in Houston. The court of civil appeals1 reversed
the trial court's judgment for the plaintiffs, finding no evidence to satisfy
the "dual purpose" rule. However, the Texas supreme court reversed'"
since the court was unable to hold that the evidence "conclusively estab-
lished that the private purpose was a motivating cause""' of the trip. "The
8 Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Sapien, 458 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1970),
error ref. n.r.e.
8 447 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1969), error ref. n.r.e.
10Id. at 701.
" The court said that sometime within the twenty-two month period a diligent claimant would
have:
(1) [made] inquiry of [her] employer as to why [she] was not to receive further
payments; (2) [made] inquiry of someone as to what was necessary to receive fur-
ther workmen's compensation benefits; (3) [filed] a claim for workmen's compensa-
tion benefits, or at the very least, [checked] to see if a claim for workmen's com-
pensation benefits had in fact been filed in her behalf.
Id. at 702.
"a"[T]he word 'furtherance' here 'connotes the conferring of a benefit on the employees by
helping to forward or advance his personal or private affairs.' " Davis v. Argonaut Southwest Ins.
Co., 14 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 158, 159 (1970), quoting Johnson v. Pacific Employers Indem. Co., 439
S.W.2d 824, 827 (Tex. 1969).
'aTEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § lb (1967).
"'14 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 158 (1970).
iS 4 5 5 S.W.2d 416 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1970).




testimony of plaintiffs, which the jury was entitled to believe, was to
the contrary.""
The federal case"' involved a close question of private versus business
motivation for a trip by the employee, his employer and a third person.
Both the employer and the employee were active in church affairs and,
in addition, the employer's business involved the construction of churches.
Thus, although the itinerary included several cities, the Detroit leg of
the trip, which proved to be fatal, was arguably in furtherance of ex-
clusively church affairs (attendance of a missionary conference). The
court upheld the jury finding for the claimant, saying that since the
claimant's deceased was the employer's "man Friday," constantly required
to be at his "beck and call," no practical distinction could be drawn be-
tween the employer's church activities and his church construction busi-
ness.
Course of Employment-Causal Connection. The quantum of proof suf-
ficient to establish causation in a workmen's compensation case is not the
same as that required in ordinary negligence cases." Proof of a mere "cau-
sal connection" will suffice in a workmen's compensation case, while a
"proximate cause" must be found in negligence cases. It is generally stated
that there must be a showing that the injury was a producing cause of the
incapacity, or that the incapacity must have naturally resulted from the
injury.
The rule attributed to Insurance Co. of North America v. Kneten,"
that the evidence must show a "reasonable probability" of causation, was
apparently followed in two cases involving oilfield workers who had died
of heart attacks. In Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Sullivan" there was
evidence of some strenuous work both on the day of death and the day
before, coupled with strong medical testimony.' The trial court judgment
for the claimant was affirmed. On the other hand, in O'dell v. Home
Indemnity Co.' no unusually strenuous work was shown and the claim-
ant's medical testimony was that the doctor "could find no cause of death
attributable to the deceased's work.""
In a third case,"0 one involving a fractured elbow which developed into
cancer, the jury found that the on-the-job injury was the producing
" Id. On a cross-point the insurance company argued that the trial court erred in admitting
testimony of the deceased's wife and son which tended to show that the deceased had planned to
stay home the weekend of the trip. The court held that such testimony was proper to show the
deceased's state of mind on the "dual purpose" issue.
"North River Ins. Co. v. Corbell, 421 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1970).
"See Musslewhite, Medical Causation Testimony in Texas: Possibility Versus Probability, 23
Sw. L.J. 622 (1969).
21440 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. 1969).
2448 S.W.2d 256 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1969), error ref. n.r.e.
"The claimant's doctor testified that, based upon "reasonable medical certainty and probability
[the deceased] suffered a cardiac infarction on the day of his death .. . as a result of the work
he did that day." Id. at 258.
24 449 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1969), error ref. n.r.e.
2 Id. at 487.




cause of the resultant loss of the arm. On appeal it was urged by the
appellant that the evidence was insufficient to prove causation. The court,
in discussing the quantum of proof necessary,"7 interpreted the Kneten
case as one decided upon a theory of "strong possibility" as opposed to
"reasonable probability." Insurance Co. of North America v. Myers"s was
also cited as a "possibility" case. The court, however, termed its discussion
a response to a hypothetical question in this instance, since whatever
proof was necessary was supplied, and the judgment for the claimant was
affirmed.
Hernia. In order to recover for a hernia resulting from an injury in the
course of employment the claimant must show, inter alia," "[t]hat the
hernia did not exist in any degree prior to the injury for which compen-
sation is claimed." ' In Security Mutual Casualty Co. v. Turner' a physi-
cian gave undisputed testimony to the effect that the claimant had a
protruding hernia fourteen months prior to the injury in question. The
claimant testified that some symptoms could have existed prior to the
injury, but that he had never suffered any real discomfort. Although
the court acknowledged that laymen are allowed much latitude in de-
scribing their physical condition, judgment was rendered for the defendant
since the claimant was not competent to give opinion evidence as to a
diagnosis which required the expertise of a qualified physician or surgeon.
Death Benefits. Notwithstanding the clear provisions that compensation
for an injury resulting in the death of an employee "shall be distributed
among the beneficiaries as may be entitled to the same as hereinbefore
provided, according to the laws of descent and distribution of this State,""
controversies still arise over such distribution.
For example, in Servantez v. Aguirre the grandfather of the deceased
employee sued his daughter, the natural mother of the deceased, to ascer-
tain the proper beneficiary. The defendant had left the child in the plain-
tiff's home seven days after his birth, and the plaintiff and his wife raised
the child as a son. The plaintiff-grandfather claimed to be the adoptive
father, but the court held that the deceased was never legally adopted
by his grandfather and that the requisites of an adoption by estoppel
were missing." The court held that there was neither a requirement for
dependency nor a penalty for abandonment, and affirmed the summary
judgment in favor of the mother.
27 The ambiguity in this area is exemplified by the fact that both parties cited Kneten and
Myers as supportive of their different positions on the quantum of proof.
U411 S.W.2d 710 (Tex. 1966).
2According to TEx. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 12b (1967) a claimant must also
show that there was an injury resulting in a hernia; that the hernia appeared suddenly and im-
mediately following the injury; and that the injury was accompanied by pain.
id.
" 457 S.W.2d 305 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1970).
" TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 8a (1967).
'456 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1970).




The parents of the deceased fared better in a case" wherein death bene-
fits had been awarded to the guardian of the deceased's minor children
who had been adopted by their mother's new husband after her divorce
from the deceased. It will be recalled that the Supreme Court of Texas,
in Patton v. Shamburger," disregarded the statutory directive that bene-
fits be distributed to the beneficiaries according to the statute of descent
and distribution under which adopted children were entitled to take from
their natural father." Instead, the court held, at least as far as death
benefits are concerned, that the adoption relationship superseded the
natural relationship and that the adopted children were no longer entitled
to death benefits. However, in Gentry v. Travelers Insurance Co.8 the
Industrial Accident Board had entered its award in favor of the adopted
children eleven days prior to the Patton decision. The insurance company
made a valiant, but delinquent, attempt to appeal the award." The court
imposed a double liability on the insurance company, finding that the
award to the adopted children, though legally incorrect, was not review-
able collaterally (and, thus, not at all) ," and that the deceased's parents
could not be denied the benefits to which they were legally entitled
under Patton.
In an important and eminently just decision4' the court of civil appeals
at Dallas escaped the rank injustice which a literal reading of Patton would
have required. The court held that denying recovery of death benefits
to an adopted minor child and awarding benefits to that child's brothers
and sisters who had not been fortunate enough to be adopted violated the
equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. In reaching its
decision the court pointed out that the children were "all 'minors' in that
they had not yet reached their majority, and [that] they were all 'children'
of the decedent in the biological sense."' Therefore, the court reasoned:
[T]he discrimination between the two classes [adopted and unadopted chil-
dren] in the case at bar [was] 'invidious' because the effect of it is to take
from a defenseless, innocent child a substantial right to certain protection
under the workmen's compensation law, not because of anything the child
has done, but wholly because of the act of one or more adults in adopting the
child. We do not think this line of discrimination can be said to have been
*a rational one' as having any bearing on public health, morals or general
welfare, or on the ground of supposed monetary advantages or disadvantages
incident to adoption of children. We do not think the discrimination can be
' Gentry v. Travelers Ins. Co., 459 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1970), error ref.
n.r.e.
3"431 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. 1968).
"See Akin, Workmen's Compensation, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 24 Sw. L.J. 141, 145
(1970).
38 459 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1970), error ref. n.r.e.
" TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 (1967) provides that appeals must be made
within twenty days.
4 Id. art. 8306, S 12d provides that the Industrial Accident Board may review and change any
award at any time within the compensation period if there is a change of condition, mistake or
fraud. The change of condition provisions refers to the condition of the injured employee, not the
"condition" of the case law.
4' Dickerson v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 451 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970).421d. at 796.
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justified on the basis of supposed pecuniary advantage to an adopted child
as compared to its siblings who are not adopted. We think it would be un-
safe and unwise to assume that an adopted child would occupy a superior
position, financially or otherwise, merely because of the adoption. The con-
verse might easily be true.'
The same reasoning applies with equal force to the discrimination
wrought by Patton.
Wage Rate. Where the only testimony pertaining to the claimant's wage
rate was that the witness knew of another employee of the same class
as the claimant, but did not know that particular employee's rate of pay,
it was held in Travelers Insurance Co. v. Gilliland" to be error to determine
the wage rate of the claimant under subsection (2) of section 1 of
article 8309.4
Although the claimant testified that he had not worked for 210 days
during the year preceding his surgery in the "same or similar work,"
the court, in Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n v. Hacker,' held that
the evidence was, nevertheless, sufficient to support the finding of the
jury that the claimant worked in the same employment for the same or
another employer for at least 210 days during the year, since the record
showed that he had worked more than 210 days for two different employ-
ers and there was testimony detailing the nature of the businesses.
The holding in Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n v. Shannon," that
the error in submitting the wage rate issue was immaterial since there was
no reason to require proof or submit an issue on a matter upon which
both parties had agreed, was reversed by the Texas supreme court.49
Medical Expenses. Since the compensation carrier was obligated to furnish
medical services to the employee until released by the settlement agree-
ment, it was held in Harleysville Mutual Insurance Co. v. Frierson" that
the employee could not compromise the accrued rights of a doctor and a
hospital which had rendered services before the settlement agreement.
The necessity of timely objection was reaffirmed in Charter Oak Fire
Insurance Co. v. Perez,5 where the trial court was held to have been en-
titled to make findings for the employee of medical, hospital, and medicinal
expense where no issue thereon was either present or requested-and no
exception was made to the omission.
'Id. at 797. The court relied on the reasoning of Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1967).
4459 S.W.2d 500 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1970).
"Tx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 1 (1967).
4The court stated that such testimony was mere opinion and not conclusively binding upon
the party. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Hacker, 448 S.W.2d 234, 237 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1969), error ref. n.r.e.
47 Id.
48453 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1970), error granted.
49462 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. 1971). The insurance company had been paying the claimant 35 dol-
lars per week as compensation, and the claimant continued to accept that amount.
50455 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1970).
51446 S.W.2d $80 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969), error ref. n.r.e.
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In Charter Oak Fire Insurance Co. v. Few the liberal construction
rule was held not to allow a claimant to recover for the medical expenses
of doctors that he himself employs unless he complies with the provisions
of section 7 of article 8306 and gives notice to the insurer." If such notice
is given, it is the obligation of the insurer to provide the medical care
within a reasonable time, and, upon default of this duty, the claimant may
obtain the needed care himself."
Subrogation. In McCann Construction Co. v. Joe Adams d4 Son" the well-
established rule that a subscriber is protected against claims for contribu-
tion and indemnity, unless he has contracted for such liability, was re-
iterated. In McCann the subscriber did so contract, and the contract was
held to be enforceable even though the injury might have been caused
by the indemnitee's own negligence.
In another suit involving McCann Construction Company a signed
release was the subject of controversy. The instrument purported to
release from liability the workmen's compensation insurer and all others
that might have been responsible for the accident. The court held that
the release was ambiguous, and resorted to extrinsic evidence. On general
principles for the construction of contracts the release was held not to
release the tort claim against a third party for negligence. "
Liability of Non-Subscriber. In Huffman v. Saenz,7 a common-law action
for negligence, a judgment for the employee was affirmed. In the affirmance
the court gave effect to the well-known first provisions of the workmen's
compensation law,"s which render a non-subscriber liable for negligence
in proximately causing injury to his employee and deprive such non-
subscriber of the common law defenses of contributory negligence, as-
sumed risk, and negligence of a fellow employee.
Previous Injury. In Alvarez v. Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n5  the
court-made law60 that the proportion of disability which results from a
prior injury is not deductible unless such prior injury was compensable
(i.e., unless it was covered by workmen's compensation), and that a prior
disease is not any defense unless it was the sole cause of the disability, was
reaffirmed.
52 456 S.W.2d 156 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1970), error granted.
"The Supreme Court of Texas granted the application for writ of error, which included this
point of error: "The Court of Civil Appeals erred in holding respondent [insurer] did not owe all
the doctor bills for services furnished [claimant] for treatment of her injuries received in the
accident." 14 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 11 (1970). See text accompanying note 64 infra.
'
4 Tvx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 7 (1967).
'48 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1970).
'McCann Constr. Co. v. Roberts, 449 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1969).
7447 S.W.2d 508 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1969), error ref. n.r.e.
*"TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, §§ 1, 4 (1967).
59450 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1970), error ref. n.r.e.




Partial Loss of Use. The recurrent contention that permanent partial
loss of the use of a specific member should draw the same compensation
as the complete loss of that member was rejected in Campbell v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co."5 The trial court was held to have correctly followed
the statutory provisions" where the jury had found that the employee
suffered temporary total loss of use of her leg for eighty weeks and thirty
per cent permanent partial loss of the use of the same leg, and the court
awarded the employee sixty per cent of her average weekly wage for
eighty weeks and thirty per cent of that figure for 120 weeks.
II. PROCEDURAL LAW
Parties. The Texas supreme court has refused the writ of error applied
for in Casper v. General Insurance Co. of America, finding no reversible
error in the decision of the court of civil appeals. The lower appellate
court had found that the absence of the husband, in a compensation suit
for injuries to the wife, did not present a case of fundamental error. The
decision was in direct conflict with a later holding of the court of civil
appeals" that the joinder of the husband was a prerequisite to the wife's
recovery of workmen's compensation benefits. Most recently, Charter Oak
Fire Insurance Co. v. Few held that where the wife was joined only
pro forma by her husband in a compensation suit for injuries to the wife,
it was fundamental error to award affirmative relief to the husband since
the workmen's compensation benefits are community property in which
he owned a one-half interest, and affirmative relief cannot be granted to
one who stands in a pro forma capacity. However, that decision was re-
versed by the Texas supreme court. By virtue of this decision the con-
flict has been resolved in favor of non-joinder. The court said that articles
4621"' and 46268 provided a sufficient basis for the holding that the hus-
band was not an indispensable party. Both statutes were incorporated into
the Texas Family Code."
Non-Suit. The general rule is that perfection of an appeal from an award
of the Industrial Accident Board nullifies the award. However, in Lowery
v. Transport Insurance Co."0 the insurer perfected his appeal, and then
tried to get by with taking a non-suit without serving the claimant. The
insurer had paid the amount of the award, and the claimant had not
' 450 S.W.2d 888 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1970), error ref. n.r.e.
6 2 TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 12 (1967).
63431 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. 1968).
" Travelers Ins. Co. v. Jacks, 441 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1969).
65456 S.W.2d 156 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1970), rev'd, 14 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 200 (1971);
see text accompanying note 52 supra.
"
6 Few v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 14 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 200 (1971), rev'g 456 S.W.2d 156
(Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1970).
07Ch. 309, § 1, [1968] Tex. Laws 708.
61 Id. at 709.
61 Ch. 888, § 6, [1970] Tex. Laws 2707, repealing TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 4621,
4626 (1968); see Tsx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, §§ 4.04, 5.22 (1970).70451 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1970).
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even filed his answer and cross action. The appeal was not thereby deemed
to be a nullity.
Venue. The venue of a maturity suit, whether brought under the first
or second paragraph of the applicable section,7' may be brought in the
county where the accident occurred, in any county where the claimants
reside, or where one or more of such claimants may have his place of
residence at the time of the institution of the suit.7
The venue of a suit against a non-subscriber is not governed by the
Workmen's Compensation Act, but by the general venue statute," as is
a suit to set aside a compromise settlement agreement.' Texas Employers'
Insurance Ass'n v. Williams" reaffirms the holding that Texas Employers'
Insurance Association is not a private corporation, association, or joint
stock company within the general statute governing suits against corpora-
tions and associations."'
Jurisdiction. In Johnson v. American General Insurance Co."' the Texas
supreme court held that the claimant was entitled to recover in court for
an occupational disease where the claim for compensation filed with the
Industrial Accident Board alleged an accidental injury at a particular time
and place. The court found no fatal variance between the claim advanced
before the board and that advanced before the court, and announced
the test to be whether there was a fair and substantial identity of the
claims.
In a similar situation the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit upheld the trial court's determination that the injury complained
of in the suit was the same as the injury that provided the basis for
claimant's claim before the Industrial Accident Board."" The nature of
the claim was not discussed in the opinion.
Summary Judgment. In Torres v. Western Casualty d Surety Co."' the
claimant's pleadings indicated that after an injury on the job, the insurance
adjuster talked to him and assured him that he was being given good care.
It was also revealed that the insurer paid his frequent medical bills and,
in addition, paid the claimant $320 in compensation benefits. In response
to a motion for summary judgment by the insurer on the. basis of the
claimant's failure to file his claim for compensation within six months
following his injury, the claimant said that he consulted an attorney and
filed his claim as soon as possible upon having doubts that the insurer
"' TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, S 5a (1967).
"aAetna Ins. Co. v. Spradley, 446 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1969).
73J. Weingarten, Inc. v. Heatherly, 450 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1970).
" Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Williams, 447 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969).
7 5 Id.
""See TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, § 3 (1964).
'7 14 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 159 (1970).
7" Vasquez v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 426 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1970).
7' 457 S.W.2d 50 (Tex. 1970); see text accompanying note 6 supra.
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intended to treat him fairly. The Texas supreme court held that unless
the insurer's evidentiary material had the effect of disproving the claimant's
justification for not filing his claim earlier, the motion must fail-there
being no burden of proof on the claimant in a motion for summary
judgment as distinguished from a motion for an instructed verdict.
Evidence-Admissibility. A variety of situations in which objections were
made to the admissibility of evidence were before the courts. For ex-
ample, it was not error to permit counsel to discuss previous injuries to
other parts of the body of the employee on voir dire examination of the
jury panel, nor was it reversible error to admit the employee's income
tax returns for previous years on the issue of a lump sum over the gen-
eral objection that only a portion of the returns was admissible."
X-rays which were not properly authenticated were properly excluded,
and evidence as to what they showed was not admissible. Conversely,
where the proper predicate has been laid, the x-rays are admissible. The
doctor's testimony based on inadmissible testimony of what was revealed
by the last x-rays did not call for a reversal in that it was not reasonably
calculated to, and probably did not, affect the verdict and judgment. 1
In Landry v. Travelers Insurance Co." the trial court had refused to
admit evidence for impeachment purposes of claimant's felony conviction
for theft of postal money orders and subsequent forgery-offenses in-
volving moral turpitude-five years and one month before the trial. The
Supreme Court of Texas held this to be a valid exercise of discretion by
the trial court.
An objection that a hypothetical question assumed things not proved
in evidence was held to be too general.'
It was held that the trial court did not commit reversible error in ex-
cluding testimony, which was tendered by the insurer for the limited
purpose of contradiction of the employee's plea for a lump sum, that
the employee was receiving $80 per month from the Veterans Administra-
tion as a totally disabled veteran of World War II. The collateral source
rule generally prohibits such testimony.
It was also held that any harm in testimony relating to the maximum
weekly compensation rate, the number of weeks for loss of the use of a
foot, and the amount of attorney's fees, was subordinated to the benefit
in affording the jury an evidentiary basis on which to answer the lump
sum issue.' This was true even though such an admission was ordinarily
reversible error. In another case, in which a lump sum was not put in
issue, the refusal of the trial court to instruct the employee's attorney
not to refer during voir dire examination or otherwise to weekly com-
s0 Alcocer v. Travelers Ins. Co., 446 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969).
1 Highland Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Helm, 449 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1969).
82458 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. 1970).
"1Royal Indem. Co. v. Smith, 456 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1970).
4Pacific Employers Indem. Co. v. Johnson, 448 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1969).
'Texas Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hooper, 448 S.W.2d 258 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1969).
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pensation and the number of weeks for which the employee was suing,
was held to be reversible error."
Evidence-Sufficiency. In a number of cases the evidence presented was
held sufficient to support judgment in favor of a claimant. In Charter
Oak Fire Insurance Co. v. Perez" sufficient evidence was produced by a
diseased worker who claimed the producing cause of occupational lung
disease to be the welding of galvanized steel. In Swift v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co. " evidence of actual control was found sufficient to support
the employer-employee relationship at a filling station, even though the
contract with the petroleum company was in the form of a lease. Keith v.
Blancett" held that the evidence raised an issue as to whether the decedent
was an independent contractor or an employee while driving a "hook-up"
for a used car dealer.
Also, in Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n v. Shannon"° the evidence
supported a finding that back and leg injuries sustained while working
on an oilfield rig were permanent. Royal Indemnity Co. v. Smith1 sus-
tained a compensation award even though the claimant was earning almost
as much at the time of the trial as he was before his accident. In Standard
Fire Insurance Co. v. Malone" a truck driver who was working and earn-
ing wages after an injury to his testicle was allowed to recover on the
basis of total incapacity for 200 weeks.
On the other hand, in Griffin v. Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n"
the employee failed to carry the burden of proof in establishing with
reasonable probability that an object which lodged in his eye while he
was working near a cotton gin caused the loss of his eye. No statement of
facts was filed in Haley v. Texas General Indemnity Co.,' and thus the
appellate court could not pass on the smallness of the judgment. In other
cases the lifting of a heavy bundle of steel rods was found not to be the
producing cause of a back injury, " and evidence of the permanent partial
loss of the use of a leg was found to be contrary to the overwhelming
weight and preponderance of the evidence."
In Travelers Insurance Co. v. Smith " the evidence was found insufficient
to prove that the claimant's heart attack resulted from strenuous lifting
8 Travelers Ins. Co. v. DeLeon, 456 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1970), error ref.
n.r.e.
87 446 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969), error ref. n.r.e.; see text accompanying
note 51 subra.
8s449 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1970).
89450 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1969).
"0453 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1970), error granted; see text accompanying
note 48 supra.
81456 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1970).
92457 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1970).
"450 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. 1970).
94 443 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1969).
'Rees v. Security Nat'l Ins. Co., 445 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969), error
ref. n.r.e.
'Harris v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 447 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1969),
error ref. n.r.e.
97448 S.W.2d 541 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1969), error ref. n.r.e.
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in the course of employment. The evidence presented in Liberty Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Pool" limited compensation to a leg injury. An employee
who, after electrical shock, suffered disability caused solely by the use or
attempted use of his ankle was not entitled to recover compensation for
general injury; nor did evidence of back injuries, work-related or other-
wise, support a finding that a back injury was not the producing cause
of any total disability, or that less than the total claimed medical bills
was attributable to an on-the-job injury."
Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n v. Polasek"' held that an employee
failed to establish that headaches, dizziness, swelling of the head, and
excessive tiredness were produced by a blow on the head and not by the
loss of his right eye. In Travelers Insurance Co. v. Rodriguez"' it was
held that the evidence failed to establish that the injury to a claimant's
hand which resulted in its loss was the producing cause of an injury to the
claimant's neck and shoulder, which resulted in total incapacity. A verdict
for permanent partial incapacity was clearly wrong and unjust in the ab-
sence of any evidence in the record jutifying such a finding."' Finally, the
evidence was found to support the total loss of the use of a foot from jump-
ing on a nail, but it did not support a finding of total and permanent
incapacity resulting from the injury to the foot and extending to and
affecting other parts of the body generally.03
Court's Charge. The court's definition of an "employee" which included
persons under an "agreement" rather than under a "contract of hire"
was held to be too broad."6 The definition of an "employee," which author-
ized the jury to find the claimant to be an employee of the insured solely
on the basis of "exercise of control" rather than the "right of control"
as required by law, was held to be reversible error.10 Since the publication
by the Committee on Pattern Jury Charges of the State Bar of Texas
of pattern charges covering workmen's compensation, " there should be
no excuse for any erroneous definitions or charges in a workmen's com-
pensation case.
A rejection by the court of the insurer's request to submit appropriate
issues which would have limited recovery to compensation for specific
injuries constituted reversible error.'
To submit both "natural result" and "producing cause" to the jury
was held to be a submission of the same matter twice, but such error was
9"449 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1969), error ref. n.r.e.
"Hardegree v. American & Foreign Ins. Co., 449 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1969).
'00451 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1970), error ref. n.r.e.
ot453 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1970), error ref. n.r.e.
102Travelers Ins. Co. v. DeLeon, 456 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1970), error ref.
n.r.e.
"03Texas Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hooper, 448 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1969).
"Travelers Ins. Co. v. Gilliland, 459 S.W.2d 500 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1970).
"0 Continental Ins. Co. v. Clark, 450 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1970).
"1I COMMITTEE ON PATTERN JuRY CHARGES OF THE STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN
JURY CHARGES (1969).
.. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Stateler, 449 S.W.2d 533 (Tex, Civ. App.-Dallas 1970).
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deemed harmless in the absence of a showing that the duplicate submission
influenced the jury to return a different verdict."'8
The court followed rules 272 and 434 of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure 0 in holding that where the appellant made no objections to
special issues, the objections were waived." 0
Argument of Counsel. Counsel's argument that the insurer's contentions
as to the claimant's course of employment and permanent disability were
the "most preposterous ever made" was held not to be of such a nature
as to bring about an improper verdict."1
In addition, the arguments of counsel that he was only talking about
401 weeks (the definition of "permanent"), that the insurer would not
pay claimant's medical bills, that the employer carried insurance to protect
claimant, and that the claimant was a weak individual confronted with
the massive power of the insurer, were held to be improper. However, they
were of a curable nature since they were not reasonably calculated to
cause and probably did not cause the rendition of an improper judgment.
The error was waived for failure to request an instruction that the argu-
ments be disregarded."'
An opposite conclusion was reached in considering counsel's arguments
in Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n v. Hacker."' There the attorney
for the claimant referred to hardship in violation of a court order, made
an argument outside the record, referred to an adjuster as "dogging" the
courtroom, and commented about the sight of an all-powerful insurance
company "kicking a workman down." The court held this was reasonably
calculated to cause, and probably did cause, the rendition of an improper
judgment. It was thus reversible error and was not cured by the trial
court's sustaining objections to the acts and words of the attorney, or
by instructing the jury not to consider such arguments. The trial court
has the duty under rule 269 (g) 114 to stop violations of the rules as to
jury argument even though no objection is made to such argument. The
court did reiterate the holdings that reference to the "golden rule" in
argument by counsel in a jury trial in a compensation case was not error. '
10a Jackson v. International Serv. Ins. Co., 450 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1970), error ref. n.r.e.
"9TEx. R. CIv. P. 272, 434.
"'Alcocer v. Travelers Ins. Co., 446 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969).
.' Pacific Employers Indem. Co. v. Johnson, 448 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1969).
... United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Huckabee, 452 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1970),
error ref. n.r.e.
113448 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1969), error ref. n.r.e.
"
4 TEx. R. Civ. P. 269(g).
"' Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Hacker, 448 S.W.2d 234, 241 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1969), error ref. n.r.e.
[Vol. 25
